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Abstract— Emergency shutdown systems (ESDs) for mining 
machinery provide critical functions to safeguard miners.
Traditionally, ESDs were realized with simple hardwired
circuits; today, there is a growing trend to use programmable 
electronic technology such as programmable logic controllers
(PLCs). This paper describes an analytical study to quantify the
safety integrity of a PLC-based ESD and a hardwired ESD. The
safety integrity level of each design approach was determined by 
quantifying the average probability of failure on demand 
(PFDavg) as described by the recommendations for programmable
electronic mining systems published by NIOSH and the IEC
61508 international standard. The safety analyses addressed 
system architecture, hardware failure probability, proof test
interval, diagnostic coverage, and human error probability. The 
results indicated that a same level of safety, safety integrity level 
3 (SIL 3), could be attained when evaluating random hardware
failures. Neither approach could attain SIL 3 if manual activation
was used. Human error was the limiting factor where, using 
human reliability analysis, PFDavg < 1 x 10-1; thus, the ESD does 
not meet SIL 1. It is apparent that automatic verses human-
activation of the ESD is a very important safety consideration. 
Manually actuated ESDs can only achieve SIL 1 regardless of the
technology; therefore, additional independent safety layers of 
protection are needed to exceed SIL 1. Secondly, it is apparent 
that the technology choice is very important. The PLC-based 
ESD was much simpler to design and to validate safety1. 
Keywords—  emergency shutdown systems; programmable 
electronic;  mining safety; electronics 
I. INTRODUCTION
Emergency shutdown systems, a.k.a. safety instrumented
systems, safety shutdown systems, protective instrument 
systems, and safety interlock systems are ubiquitous in mining;
they are an integral part of moving machinery such as longwall 
systems, continuous mining machines, and conveyors.
Traditionally, ESDs were realized with electro-mechanical 
circuits comprised of switches and relays hardwired together. 
These circuits were relatively simple and easy to understand
because they consisted of just a few components and because 
their behavior under fault conditions could be completely 
determined. They were also easy to understand in terms of
1 The findings and conclusions in this report are those of
the author(s) and do not represent the views of the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. 
design, operation, maintenance, and repair because the
component failure modes were limited, well understood, and
generally discernable by visual inspection or by the use of
simple instrumentation such as a multi-meter. For instance, one
could easily determine that a relay had failed by seeing the 
contacts welded together or by making a simple resistance
measurement of relay coil to determine that the coil had 
opened.  
Today, the mining industry is using modern technologies 
such as programmable electronics (PE) for mining machine 
control and for implementing ESD functions. Great care 
coupled with substantial expertise must be taken to use PE 
technology (i.e., software, PLCs, and microprocessors). This
technology poses unique technical and managerial challenges
to assure safety. For instance, all possible failure modes are not
completely known or the behavior under fault conditions can 
not be completely determined for PE-based systems. Also,
there are failure modes that are different from electro-
mechanical systems. Lastly, anecdotal evidence indicates that
there is confusion and uncertainty in the mining industry 
concerning the safety of PE-based ESDs. For instance, the
author has been asked many questions at workshops addressing 
the safety of PE-based mining systems that he conducted in the 
U.S. and Australia. Most of the questions were variations of the 
following: “What must be considered when designing a PE-
based ESD?” “Are programmable electronic ESDs as safe as 
relay-based or hardwired ESD?”
This paper addresses these questions about the safety of PE-
based ESDs by conducting an analytical study to quantify the 
safety integrity of a PLC-based ESD and a hardwired ESD. The 
safety analyses addresses system architecture, hardware failure 
probability, proof test interval, diagnostic coverage, and human 
error probability. The analysis incorporates the latest best
practices to address the safety of PE-based mining systems and
the IEC 61508 international standard. 
II. DEFINITIONS
Diagnostic coverage – The fractional decrease in the 
probability of dangerous hardware failure resulting from the 
successful operation of the automatic diagnostic tests. 
Dangerous failure – A failure having the potential to put the



















   
  











   













    
  
 
The probability of a dangerous failure is λD and is equal to the 
sum of λDD and λDU. 
Dangerous failure detected – A failure detected by on-line 
diagnostic tests such that the system will be placed into a safe 
state. The probability of detecting a dangerous failure is λDD. 
Dangerous failure undetected – A failure that is undetected 
by on-line diagnostic tests such that the system will not be
placed into a safe state. The probability of not detecting a
dangerous failure is λDU. 
Failure - The termination of the ability of a functional unit 
to perform a required function. The failure rate λ is equal to the 
sum of dangerous failures λD and safe failures λS. 
Mean time to fail safe (MTTFS) – The average time until a
system fails safely (i.e. a spurious or nuisance trip). 
Probability of failure on demand (PFD) – A value that
indicates the probability of a system failing to respond on
demand for a safety function. PFD pertains to dangerous failure 
modes. The average probability of a system failing to respond
to a demand in a specified time interval is PFD avg.. 
Safe failure – A failure that does not put the safety-related
system in a dangerous or fail-to-function state. The probability
of a safe failure is λS. 
Safe failure fraction (SFF) – A metric (calculated using 
equation 4) used for constraining the maximum SIL that can be 
claimed regardless of the calculated hardware reliability.  
Safety integrity: The probability of a safety-related system
satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under 
the stated conditions within a stated time period [1].  
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) - One of three possible discrete
integrity levels (SIL 1, SIL 2, SIL 3) defined by quantitative or
qualitative methods. SIL 3 has the highest level of safety 
integrity for mining [2]. IEC 61508 uses four SILs. 
Type A component – All failure modes are known and can 
be computed. Also, the behavior under fault conditions can be
completely determined. A relay is considered to be type A. 
Type B component – All failure modes are not completely 
known or the behavior under fault conditions can not be 
completely determined.  A PLC is considered to be type B.
1oo1 – A one out of one (1oo1) or simplex architecture 
consisting of a single channel.
1oo2 – A one out of two or dual channel architecture. 
Diagnostic capabilities are designated as 1oo2D. 
III. BEST PRACTICES AND STANDARDS EASE OF USE
NIOSH, working in conjunction with Mine Safety and
Health Administration (MSHA), and the System Safety Mining
Industry Workgroup, has established a formalized safety 
framework for PE-based mining systems[3]. It is realized by a 
five-part set of best practice recommendations and a four-part 
set guidance documents for use by mining companies, original 
equipment manufacturers, suppliers, and MSHA. The best 
practice recommendations are based on IEC 61508. They
establish the processes and outcomes for the safety life cycle
phases that included system scope, hazard and risk analyses,
overall safety requirements, system realization (design), and 
safety validation of PE-based systems[2]. The best practice 
recommendations were used to conduct the safety analyses of
this paper. These best practice recommendations do not
exclude the use of PE-based systems for an ESD. To our 
knowledge, no standard excludes the use of PE for an ESD.
IV. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OVERVIEW
The designer needs to consider many factors and design
options for an ESD. These factors include component failure 
rates, component technologies, architectures, and testing 
strategies. The design process includes evaluation of the 
design’s safety performance with respect to the target SIL
value and MTTFS. If the safety and reliability are not
sufficient, then the conceptual design is changed; thus, it is an 
iterative process (Fig 1.).  
A.	 Technology Choices 
ESDs can be implemented using electrical, electronic, 
pneumatic, mechanical, hydraulic, and programmable 
electronic elements [4]. The choice of technologies is a
decision the designer should make early. In general, the main
technology choices are:
•	 Relays – Relays are simple devices and their failure 
modes and rates are well known and predictable. They 
are typically used for simple functions requiring a few 
inputs and outputs.  
•	 Solid-state devices – These devices do not use 
software, thus their flexibility is restricted. Solid-state
devices can incorporate limited diagnostic and testing 
features. Some solid-state devices have identifiable and 
predictable failure modes under fault conditions. 
Figure 1. The design process is an iterative part of the safety life cycle.
•	 PE-based devices – Microprocessors and PLCs are
widely used PE-based devices. They are more flexible 
































    
 
 






   
 
    
   
 
 
   








modes are not predictable and failures (hardware or
software) can be difficult to detect and diagnose. 
B. Architectures 
The ESD architecture is important to consider. Various
voting architectures (Table I) are used to help realize the 
required safety performance for a given application. These
architectures can also add fault tolerance capabilities; however, 
merely adding fault tolerance does not always improve safety
performance. The architecture choice involves consideration of 
factors such as the required SIL and the MTTFS. This 
reliability metric is important for safety because high nuisance 
trip rates can result in people disabling the ESD. 
C. Architecture impacts on safety performance.
Frederickson [5] presents several examples of how the 
architecture impacts safety performance. The examples involve 
several PLC-based safety systems. We extract the SIL and 
MTTFS data for the four architectures of Table I, and define a 
test interval of 12 months. The attained SIL, the approximate
PFDavg, and the approximate MTTFS for each architecture is
listed by Table II. The results were determined by Markov
model analysis of random hardware failure rates.  
TABLE I. REPRESENTATIONS OF VARIOUS ARCHITECTURES 
Voting 
Architecture 









Architecture MTTFS (years) PFDavg SIL 
1oo1 2.0 1.3 x 10-3 2 
1oo2 0.8 0.003 x 10-3 Exceeds 3 
2oo2 600 2.8 x 10-3 2 
2oo3 210 0.009 x 10-3 Exceeds 3 
Increasing the fault tolerance from 1oo1 to 1oo2 improved 
the safety performance from SIL2 to SIL3; however, the 
MTTFS decreased resulting in over double the spurious trips. 
Increasing the redundancy by using the 2oo2 architecture 
improved the MTTFS by a factor of 300; however, the SIL 
didn’t improve as compared to the 1oo1 architecture. Thus,
adding redundancy does not always improve safety in terms of 
both the SIL and MTTFS. The 2oo3 architecture has the best
safety performance; but, it would be the most costly PLC.
V. SIL CONSTRAINTS DUE TO HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE
The highest SIL that can be claimed for a given architecture 
is restricted. The IEC 61508 constraints for type A and type B
devices are given by the Tables III and IV respectively.
VI. FAILURE DATA SOURCES
Failure data are needed to calculate PFDavg for low demand 
applications and to calculate the probability of a dangerous 
failure for high demand applications. In addition to failure 
rates, the failure modes (safe and dangerous) and the
effectiveness of automatic diagnostics are needed. 
Numerous data sources exist; some are industry specific, 
product specific, generic, or site specific. For instance, a site-
specific data base could contain failure rate and mode data for 
solenoid valves used at a given mine. Some common failure 
data sources are: 
• Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) [6] 
• Reliability Data for Control and Safety Systems [7] 
• Non-electronic Parts Reliability Data Book [8]
• The Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook [9]
An extensive listing of failure data sources is available at
http://www.ntnu.no/ross/info/data.php. 




Safe failure fraction (SFF) Hardware fault tolerance  
0 1 2 
< 60% SIL1 SIL2 SIL3 
60% - < 90 % SIL2 SIL3 exceeds SIL3 
90 % - < 99 % SIL3 exceeds SIL3 exceeds SIL3 
≥ 99 % SIL3 exceeds SIL3 exceeds SIL3 




Safe failure Hardware fault tolerance  
fraction (SFF) 0 1 2 
< 60% Not allowed SIL1 SIL2 
60% - < 90 % SIL1 SIL2 SIL3
90 % - < 99 % SIL2 SIL3 exceeds SIL3 
≥ 99 % SIL3 exceeds SIL3 exceeds SIL3 
VII. ESD COMPARISON
A hypothetical example is presented for two hardwired
designs and two PLC-based designs for a ESD to be used on a
remote-controlled continuous mining machine. The mining
machine does have a PLC that provides some machine control
functions.
An ESD is needed to achieve and maintain a safe state for 
certain hazards identified by a system-level hazard and risk 
analysis for the mining machine. The hazard for this example is










    

























       
 
The following ESD designs are examples for illustrative 
purposes only. The examples do not detail every task or 
process given by the best practice recommendations for
mining; however, they do focus on key design considerations
items such as SILs, system architecture, hardware failure
probability, proof test interval, diagnostic coverage, and human 
reliability. Lastly, the parameter values for each design are 
illustrative; they are assumptions and not actual values. 
A. SIL Assignment
The safety performance to mitigate the hazard is defined by 
one of three SIL values where SIL 1 is the lowest safety 
performance. The SIL can be determined qualitatively by using 
a risk matrix or a risk graph (Fig 2.). The unexpected machine
movement hazard is assigned SIL 3; therefore, the ESD must 
attain a SIL 3. The SIL was determined given the parameters 
CD, FA, PA, X5 and W2 that are defined as follows:  
Figure 2. Risk Graph [10]
C - Consequence (severity of injury) 
CA: minor injury, no lost work days
CB: moderate injury, lost work days 
CC: severe injury, permanent disability  
CD: death or multiple deaths
F - Frequency and exposure time to the hazard 
FA: rarely to more often
FB: frequently to continuously 
P - Possibility of avoiding a hazardous event 
PA:  possible under certain conditions 
PB:  almost impossible 




Xn - SIL matrix row identifier 
B. Hardwired ESD using a 1oo1 architecture 
This design consists of a generic switch directly wired to
the main line circuit breaker as depicted by Fig 3. The design
can be abstracted as a single sensor, logic solver, and field 
device configured in a 1oo1 architecture. The switch is the
sensor; the logic solver is the wire; the field device is the circuit
breaker. None of the components have diagnostics, so safe and 
dangerous failures are not detected. All components are type A. 
The following parameters are assumed:   
Test interval (TI) = once a year (8760 hours) 
λDD = 0 (because no diagnostic coverage) 
λDU = λD (because no diagnostic coverage) 
Switch: λ = 1.0 x 10-6; λS = 0.60 x 10-6; λD = 0.40 x 10-6 
Wire: λ = 1.1 x 10-8; λS = 1.0 x 10-8; λD =.01 x 10-8 
Circuit breaker: λ = 1.5 x 10-6; λS = 1.38 x 10-6; λD= 0.12 x 10-6 
Figure 3. ESD system using a single, generic switch 
1) SIL Verification
The SIL is verified by using the simplified equations to find
the PFDavg of each component and of the overall ESD. The 
achieved SIL is determined by using Table V given a low-
demand of operation for the ESD. Low demand is when the 
frequency of operation is less than once a year or no greater 
than twice the frequency of tests (proof tests) to detect failures 
in the safety-related system.  
PFDavg = λDU x (TI / 2)   (1) 
PFDavg switch = 1.75 x 10-3 (SIL 2) 
PFDavg wire = 4.38 x 10-6 (SIL 3) 
PFDavg circuit breaker = 5.26 x 10-4 (SIL 3) 
PFDavg system = PFDavg switch + PFDavg wire + PFDavg circuit breaker (2) 













   
 


















                    







                        
     
 
    
 
 











TABLE V. SILS FOR A LOW-DEMAND MODE OF OPERATION. 
Safety integrity level (SIL) Low demand mode  PFDavg 
1 10-1 to 10-2 
2 10-2 to 10-3 
3 10-3 to 10-4 
Next, the MTTFS is calculated for each component and for 
the overall ESD (Table VI). The equations do not include terms 
for systematic error rate and common cause terms [11]. The 
spurious trip rate (STR) = λS for this example and MTTFS= 1/ 
λS. The STR for the overall ESD is the summation of the STR 
for each component. The MTTFS for the ESD is 57.36 years.  
C. Hardwired ESD using a 1oo2 switch architecture 
The safety performance is increased by using multiple 
switches in a 1oo2 architecture as depicted by Fig 4. The test
interval was unchanged. The switch parameters unchanged and 
are as follows:
switch: λ = 1.0 x 10-6; λS = 0.60 x 10-6; λD = 0.40 x 10-6 








Switch 0.60 x 10-6 2.5 x 106 285.39 
Wire 1.00 x 10-8 1.00 x 108 1.14 x 104 
Circuit breaker 1.38 x 10-6 7.25 x 105 82.72 
Overall ESD 1.99 x 10-6 5.03 x 105 57.36 
To Load Center












Figure 4. ESD system using switches configured in a 1oo2 architecture 
1) SIL Verification
PFD1oo2 switch   = (λDU 2 x TI2) / 3 (3) 
PFD1oo2 switch   = ((.40 x 10-6) 2x (8760) 2) / 3 = 4.1 x 10-6 
The other components are unchanged where the PFDavg 
wire = 4.38 x 10-6 and PFDavg circuit breaker = 5.26 x 10-4. 
Therefore, using equation 2 
PFDavg system = 5.31 x 10-4 (SIL3). 
The new design meets SIL 3 as determined by using Table 
V; however, the verification is not completed because the 
system architecture restriction has not been taken into account.  
The SFF, fault tolerance, and Table III are needed to 
determine the maximum SIL that can be claimed. The fault 
tolerance is one because of the 1oo2 switch architecture. The
SFF is calculated as follows using λS and λD for each
component:
SFF= (∑ λS + ∑ λDD) / (∑ λS + ∑ λD)  (4) 
∑ λS = 0.60 x 10-6 + 1.00 x 10-8 + 1.38 x 10-6 = 1.99 x 10-6 
∑ λD = 0.40 x 10-6 + 0.01 x 10-8 + 0.12 x 10-6 = 5.20 x 10-7 
∑ λDD = 0 (because no diagnostics) 
SFF = 0.793 or 79.3% 
The maximum SIL that can be claimed is SIL 3, using 
Table III with SFF = 79.3% and a hardware fault tolerance of
1; therefore, the SIL is not constrained by the architecture. 
Hence, the hardware is verified to meet the target of SIL 3.
Next, the MTTFS is calculated for each component and for 
the overall ESD (Table VII). The STR for switches arranged in 
a 1oo2 architecture is calculated as follows: 
STR = 2λs + 2λs (5) 
STR = 2(0.60 x 10-6) + 2(0.60 x 10-6) = 2.4 x 10-6 
The MTTFS for the ESD is 30.12 years. 








1oo2 Switches  2.4 x 10-6 4.17 x 105 47.56 
Wire 1.0 x 10-8 1.00 x 108 1.14 x 104 
Circuit breaker 1.38 x 10-6 7.25 x 105 82.72 
Overall ESD 3.79 x 10-6 26.4 x 105 30.12 
D. An Industrial PLC-based ESD using a 1oo1 architecture 
The design (Fig 5.) is essentially the same as in the prior 
example except that the logic solver is a generic, industrial 
PLC. This is an existing PLC that provides machine control 
functions. The ESD design uses the existing PLC’s spare input
and output channels. Note that using the system for control and
safety purposes is possible, but not recommended [2]. Safety
systems should be independent of the control systems. Note
that failure of the PLC would impact both the control and
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Figure 5. A conceptual diagram of a PLC-based safety system that shares a 
1oo1 industrial  PLC used for machine control.
The same switches and circuit breaker from the previous 
examples are used. The following parameters are assumed for a
generic, industrial PLC with some built-in diagnostics:
PLC: λ = 3.8 x 10-6; λS = 2.11 x 10-6; λD = 1.69 x 10-6 
The PLC is a type B component. 
1) SIL Verification
The achieved SIL of this design is verified with the aid of a 
PC-based software tool for calculations of PFDavg given the 
system architecture and other parameters. The following
parameters are used by the tool: 
β [%] – The β-factor or common cause factor.  
Type A/B – Component type A or B
λ [1/h] – Failure rate (failures per hour) 
[%] Safe – The safe failure percentage. This is similar to SFF. 
DC safe – Diagnostic coverage for safe failures. 
DC dangerous – Diagnostic coverage for dangerous failures. 
MTTR [hour] – Mean time to repair.  
TI [months] – Testing interval. 
The tool calculates PFDavg for each component and for the
system, the SIL, the MTFFS, and the architectural constraints. 
Table VIII lists a summary of the results from the tool. The 
results showed that when using this PLC, the ESD theoretically
met SIL 2; however, the PLC is a type B device so the 
architectural constrains of Table IV were used. As a result, the 
ESD can only attain SIL 1 even though the design used the 
same 1oo2 switch redundancy and circuit breaker of previous 
designs. The limiting component with respect to SIL for the 
system is the PLC. Increasing the redundancy or the reliability
of the switches or circuit breaker will not increase the system
SIL. Lastly, the MTTFS for this ESD is 16.17 years. 
TABLE VIII. SIL VERIFICATION OF A GENERIC PLC-BASED ESD.
E. A Safety PLC-based ESD system 
This design example changes the generic, industrial PLC to
a 1oo2D Safety PLC with diagnostics that is certified to SIL 3.
Table IX lists the results from the SIL tool. The results show
that when using a Safety PLC, the SIL = 3. The SIL was not 
restricted because of the Safety PLC has redundancy to tolerate
one fault. Lastly, the MTTFS for this ESD is 26.17 years. 
TABLE IX. SIL VERIFICATION FOR A SAFETY PLC-BASED ESD.
Component Architecture Type MTTFS 
(years) 
PFDavg 
Switches 1oo2 A 47.56 3.9 x 10-5 
Safetyl PLC 1oo2D B 196.5 2.35 x 10-5 
Circuit breaker 1oo1 A 82.72 5.25 x 10-4 
Overall ESD - - 26.17 5.88 x 10-4 
VIII. SYSTEMATIC FAILURES
The safety integrity of a system consists of the hardware 
safety integrity and the systematic safety integrity. Hardware 
safety integrity is a function of random hardware failures and
common cause failures; these are physical failures. Systematic
safety integrity is a function of error such as operator error,
software design errors, and maintenance errors; these are all 
functional failures.  
Only hardware safety integrity has been considered up to 
this point. Systematic errors concerning software and the
human operator are addressed in the following sections. 
A. Software Integrity 
Software failures result from systematic (functional) errors. 
The likelihood of systematic failures is very difficult to
estimate; therefore, various processes and techniques are used
in an attempt to avoid them. For instance, software safety life
cycles have been established that address things such as 
software requirement specifications, software management of
change procedures, and software verification and validation
(V&V) methods[12]. 
The rigor of V&V and the expenditure of resources for
systematic failure avoidance increases as the SIL increases.
This is evident in software (V&V) techniques listed by Table X 
[12]. This table applies to the ESD software. 
The development and assessment of safety-related software
is beyond the scope of this paper. Safety-related software
should be developed, verified and validated, documented, and
maintained as recommended by the best practices for PE-based 
mining systems [12] and other standards [1].
Component Architecture Type MTTFS 
(years) 
PFDavg 
Switches 1oo2 A 47.56 3.9 x 10-5 
Generic PLC 1oo1 B 35.14 4.8 x 10-3 
Circuit breaker 1oo1 A 82.72 5.25 x 10-4 
 
    
  
  
    
  
    
 
      
 





      
 
 
    
  
  
    
 




    
 




      
    
    
    
    







































TABLE X. SOFTWARE V&V ACTIVITIES FOR VARIOUS SILS [1][12].




Required  Required  Required 
Design Review Required  Required  Required 
Code Review Required  Required  Required 
Structure Analysis Not required Required  Required 
Boundary Value 
Analysis
Required  Required  Required 
 Control Flow 
Analysis
Not required Required  Required 
Data Flow
Analysis
Not required Not required Required 
Error Anomaly
Analysis




Required  Required  Required 
 Boundary Values Required  Required  Required 
Special Values Required  Required  Required 




Required  Required  Required 




Not required Required  Required 
Decision-to-
Decision Path 
Not required Not required Required 
Data Flow
Coverage  
Not required Recommended Required 
Performance 
Testing  
Required  Required  Required 
Failure Mode and
Stress Testing 
Recommended Required  Required 
Modeling and Simulation: 
Structure 
Diagrams
Not required Required  Required 
Data Flow
Diagrams
Not required Required  Required 
Finite State
Machines 
Not required Required  Required.
Formal Models Not required Not required Recommended 
Performance 
Models 
Not required Not required Required 
State Models Not required Required  Required 
Prototypes  Not required Not required Required 
Symbolic 
Execution 
Not required Not required Recommended 
Formal Analysis Not required Not required Recommended 
Interface Testing Required  Required  Required 
B. Human reliability 
Human reliability is critical because the human is a part of 
the system; the human must initiate the ESD. The human
element poses significant limitations. For instance, a person 
might not recognize the need to activate the ESD or there could
be situations in which a person would not be able to activate 
the ESD in time to prevent a mishap.  
Human reliability analysis was used to determine human
errors such that it can be factored into quantitative SIL 
verification. There are a number of practical methods for
estimating human reliability such as HEART (human error 
assessment and reduction technique), THREP (Technique for
human error rate prediction), and the method named TESO 
(empirical technique to estimate operator errors) [13]. 
Human reliability was calculated for the ESDs using TESO. 
Basically, TESO estimated the human error probability by the
multiplication of five factors; the human task, time stress, 
operator expertise, anxiety, and ergonomic factors. TESO
assigns probabilities for each factor based on a set of conditions
specific to each factor. The human task to activate the ESD 
requires attention; so, the base error rate .01 was assigned for
the first factor of human task. The other factors were assigned 
as time stress = 10 (high), operator expertise = 0.5 (expert),
anxiety = 3 (emergency), and ergonomic factors = 1(good). 
Multiplying each factor results in an error probability of 0.15;
thus, the human operator does not even achieve SIL 1. 
Therefore, the ESD will not meet SIL 3.
IX. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The hardwired ESDs were simple in terms of design and 
safety verification. They required just a few components, they 
did not need software, and the safety verifications were 
straightforward in that simplified equations could be used to
calculate PFDavg and MTFFS. However, the hardwired 1oo1
ESD could only achieve SIL 2 with respect to the hardware
safety integrity. The SIL could be increased to SIL 3 by
increasing the reliability of the switch and adding 1oo2 switch
redundancy. Although this met SIL 3, the MTTFS decreased
over 50%. Lastly, neither hardwired ESD had any impact on
the existing industrial PLC used for control purposes because
both ESD designs followed good engineering practices to keep
safety systems independent of control systems. Overall, the
resources needed to design and verify each design would be 
anticipated to be relatively low.  
Two PLC-based ESDs were presented. The first design
used a generic PLC and the same 1oo2 switches from the 
hardwired ESD design that met SIL 3 with a MTFFS = 30.12 
years; however, the generic, industrial PLC-based ESD only
met SIL 1 with respect to the hardware safety integrity because
the SIL was restricted given that the PLC did not have fault 
tolerance. Also, the MTFFS decreased about 50% to 16.17 
years. The safety performance was increased to SIL 3 by using 
a safety PLC that was specially designed for safety-related 
applications. The Safety PLC also improved the MTFFS to
26.17 years. Lastly, both PLC-based ESDs had a significant
























   
   













































industrial PLC used for control purposes changed from a 
common PLC to a specialized Safety PLC that offered fault 
tolerance, better diagnostics, and better hardware failure 
reliability. Overall, the resources needed to design and verify 
each PLC-based design would be greater than the hardwired
ESDs. First, Safety PLCs have a cost premium depending on 
the degree of fault tolerance, component reliability, and the 
diagnostic coverage. Both PLC-based ESDs would also require 
safety-related software that would require additional resources 
for design, V&V, documentation, and maintenance. Significant
resources are needed for the software. This is especially 
apparent when inspecting the numerous software V&V 
activities of Table X. 
X. CONCLUSIONS
It is apparent that a safety issue of importance should 
concern automatic verses human-activation of the ESD. None
of the ESDs could attain an overall SIL 3 because manual 
activation was used. Human error was the limiting factor where 
the human achieved less than SIL 1; thus, the entire ESD did 
not meet SIL 1. Additional independent safety layers of
protection are needed if any of the ESDs are to exceed SIL 1. 
The protection layers could consist of procedures, alarms, 
electrical protection devices, and other safety-related systems 
that do not require human activation.  
Secondly, it is important to consider the architecture 
because it impacts the SIL and MTTFS as shown by Table II. 
Increasing the redundancy, regardless of the technology used, 
does not always improve safety performance.  
Thirdly, it is not desirable, in terms of safety and 
economics, for one system to implement both control and
safety functions. Safety systems such as ESDs should be 
independent of the control systems because a failure of the PLC 
would impact both the control and safety system. Also, for the 
examples presented, it does not appear to make economic sense 
to use the PLC for the ESD because adding the ESD safety 
function to the generic, industrial PLC used for control caused
the entire PLC to be replaced with a more costly Safety PLC 
certified to SIL 3 even though the generic PLC was sufficient 
for control purposes. 
Lastly, it is apparent that the ESD technology has a 
significant impact with respect to resources for design and 
safety verification. Both PLC-based ESDs would require more 
resources compared to the hardwired ESDs that did not need
software. A detailed cost analysis is needed to quantify these 
differences. 
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